Snyder and Borghard - The Cost of an Empty Threat by Fiammenghi, Davide
American Political Science Review Vol. 105, No. 3 August 2011
doi:10.1017/S000305541100027X
The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound
JACK SNYDER and ERICA D. BORGHARD Columbia University
A large literature in political science takes for granted that democratic leaders would pay substantialdomestic political costs for failing to carry out the public threats they make in internationalcrises, and consequently that making threats substantially enhances their leverage in crisis
bargaining. And yet proponents of this audience costs theory have presented very little evidence that
this causal mechanism actually operates in real—as opposed to simulated—crises. We look for such
evidence in post-1945 crises and find hardly any. Audience cost mechanisms are rare because (1) leaders
see unambiguously committing threats as imprudent, (2) domestic audiences care more about policy
substance than about consistency between the leader’s words and deeds, (3) domestic audiences care
about their country’s reputation for resolve and national honor independent of whether the leader has
issued an explicit threat, and (4) authoritarian targets of democratic threats do not perceive audience costs
dynamics in the same way that audience costs theorists do. We found domestic audience costs as secondary
mechanisms in a few cases where the public already had hawkish preferences before any threats were
made.
James Fearon’s seminal (1994) article on the do-mestic political costs of getting caught bluffing inan international crisis has spurred over 400 ref-
erences in scholarly journals to “audience costs.” The
main claim of this literature is that democracies whose
leaders threaten force in international crises tend to get
their way because the high domestic political costs of
backing down make those threats credible in the eyes
of their adversaries.
This argument might be viewed in a benign light as
part of a broader claim that the peace among democ-
racies rests on their ability to credibly signal their in-
terests and commitments in international bargaining
(Fearon 1994, 577; Lipson 2003). However, a less be-
nign implication is that democracies (and perhaps those
authoritarian leaders who are accountable to domes-
tic elites) can successfully bully nonaccountable states
by using belligerent foreign policy rhetoric to tie their
own hands (Weeks 2008). This elaborates on Thomas
Schelling’s (1960, 1966) analyses of the tactical advan-
tages of throwing out the steering wheel in teenage
hot rodders’ games of chicken, a tactic that Schelling
(1960, 28) and Fearon (1994, 587) argue democracies
are especially well suited to exploit. Viewed in this light,
the anticipation of audience costs could lock opponents
into commitments to fight over stakes that would oth-
erwise not warrant going to war (Fearon 1994, 583).
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Notwithstanding the widespread popularity and
weighty implications of these conjectures, empirical
tests of domestic audience costs theory in a real-world
international setting have been inconclusive. One prob-
lem is that audience costs theorists have argued that ra-
tional leaders will not make bluffing threats in circum-
stances where they might have to pay heavy audience
costs, so audience costs are likely to come into play
only in cases where they cannot be observed (Schultz
2001b). Another is the difficulty in statistical studies of
distinguishing the effects of hands-tying threats from
other possible informational advantages of democracy,
such as greater transparency or better policy analy-
sis. To overcome such inference problems, Kenneth
Schultz has suggested historical process tracing of crises
where the anticipation of potential domestic audience
costs mechanisms may have shaped tactics and out-
comes (2001b, 53). Beyond a few brief narratives, how-
ever, there has heretofore been little effort to examine
crisis processes in this way.
Based on a review of post-1945 crisis histories, we
find that domestic audience costs mechanisms rarely
play a significant role, let alone the “crucial” one that
Fearon (1994, 577) claims, for four main reasons. First,
leaders see unambiguously committing threats (ones
that commit a previously uncommitted actor) as impru-
dent. They almost always seek to retain significant flex-
ibility, rather than lock in. Second, domestic audiences
care more about the overall substantive consequences
of a leader’s policy than about consistency between the
leader’s words and deeds. We found no case where a
public holding dovish policy views punished a leader
for the inconsistency of failing to carry out a public
threat. Third, domestic audiences’ concern about their
countries’ reputations for resolve and national honor
is largely independent of whether a leader has issued
an explicit threat. And fourth, authoritarian targets of
democratic threats do not perceive audience costs dy-
namics in the same way that audience costs theorists
do.
On the relatively rare occasions when domestic au-
dience costs do come into play, they tend to emerge in
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situations in which public opinion is already inclined
to favor a hard-line diplomatic stance, and where the
public has pressed the leader to make the threat in
the first place.1 In that situation, it is difficult to dis-
entangle the domestic costs of getting caught bluffing
from the costs of defying a public with substantively
hawkish preferences. Schultz is right that leaders avoid
reckless bluffs, but the reason is that empty threats
make for substantively imprudent policy, not just that
leaders fear being caught in an inconsistency. Domestic
audience costs, defined as the domestic political price
a leader pays simply for failing to carry out a public
threat, are a minor, derivative consideration.
We first review and criticize four assumptions of au-
dience costs theory that must hold true for domestic
audience costs to have a significant effect on crisis
outcomes. We do not claim that this critique consti-
tutes an alternative theory of crisis bargaining. Rather,
we make two less ambitious points: (1) even staying
within the logic of rationalist bargaining theory, au-
dience costs theory depends on implausible simplify-
ing assumptions that ignore or minimize powerful in-
centives shaping the choices of prudent leaders and
publics, and (2) cognitive limitations of the threatened
authoritarian leaders are likely to further erode do-
mestic audience costs effects. Following this theoretical
critique, we then briefly review previous efforts to test
domestic audience costs theory quantitatively, experi-
mentally, and qualitatively. Finally, we explain how we
use post-1945 crises to address inference problems in
this literature, present our case selection criteria, and
assess the causal impact of audience costs in several
crises, especially the Suez crisis, the Iran hostage crisis,
the Sino-Indian War, and the Cuban missile crisis.
AUDIENCE COSTS THEORY
“Domestic audience costs” can be pithily defined as
“the domestic price that a leader would pay for making
foreign threats and then backing down” (Tomz 2007,
821).2 Audience costs theorists have argued that the
domestic public would feel that such a leader would
have a severely compromised reputation for making
credible commitments, and thus should be removed
from power (Guisinger and Smith 2002; Schultz 2001b,
34), or that voters might assume that leaders who back
down after making a threat are generally incompetent
in foreign affairs (Smith 1998).
Some scholars have used the term with a much
broader meaning, including any public dissatisfaction
with a leader who fails to protect the nation’s honor,
whether related to an empty threat or not, or an author-
itarian regime that permits its domestic public to ex-
press hawkish opinions (Weiss 2006). We do not doubt
that leaders might pay costs if they pursue weak policies
in the face of a hawkish public, but this has little to do
1 In contrast, Tomz (2007, 831) argues that audience costs should be
larger when the public has substantive policy reasons to be dovish.
2 Similarly, Schultz (2001b, 33) says, “audience costs—costs that are
imposed by domestic audiences if the leader makes a public threat
and then fails to carry through on it.”
with the core logic of audience costs theory. We use the
term in the narrow, analytically precise sense of Fearon
and Tomz.
Fearon clarifies the meaning of the term by distin-
guishing between “two sorts of costs that leaders face
for backing down in a crisis.” “First, there is the do-
mestic and international price for conceding the issues
at stake, which is the same regardless of when conces-
sions are made or after how much escalation. Second,
there are whatever additional costs are generated in
the course of the crisis itself.” These additional costs
include, he says, the physical costs of the crisis, the risk
that the crisis will escalate to accidental or preemptive
war, and “international and domestic audience costs”
(1994, 579–80). This last category consists of “signaling
costs” in the eyes of these audiences when a leader
backs down after making “a show of force” or “public
demands or threats” (1994, 580–81).
Fearon makes expansive claims for the “centrality of
domestic audience costs” in shaping crisis interaction
(1994, 578), arguing that the character of crises as “pub-
lic events taking place in front of domestic political
audiences . . . is crucial to understanding why they occur
and how they unfold” (1994, 577). Because his model
assumes that public information about capabilities and
the opponents’ respective evaluations of the stakes is
already taken into account in leaders’ decisions to em-
bark on a crisis, he claims that additional audience costs
incurred during the crisis, especially domestic costs,
“may be primary” in determining the tactics and out-
come of the crisis bargaining (1994, 578, 581).
Fearon says that domestic audience costs affect the
bargaining in two ways. First, the willingness of leaders
to make public threats that expose them to potential
audience costs credibly signals their high resolve to
their opponents. Second, leaders who are accountable
to domestic constituencies may be able to use public
threats to engage reputational stakes that “lock in” a
sufficient motive for fighting, even if their precrisis mo-
tivation fell short of this level (1994, 583). If it becomes
clear during the course of crisis escalation that one of
the sides has become “locked in” in this way, that side
prevails in the crisis bargaining. However, if both sides
become locked in before the crisis interaction clarifies
which side has the greater resolve, then war can occur as
a result of these “additional” domestic audience costs.
From these assumptions, Fearon derives a number
of hypotheses about bargaining tactics and outcomes.
Regime types with greater accountability to a domes-
tic audience, especially democracies, are more likely
to prevail in crisis bargaining. Democracies and other
accountable regimes are less likely to engage in limited
probes that require making threatening moves with the
possibility of backing away in the face of resistance.
Crises involving democracies (and other regimes ac-
countable to a domestic audience) should see fewer es-
calatory steps than crises between authoritarian states,
because credible communication is easier to accom-
plish. Because democracies have stronger incentives
to escalate in crises when facing authoritarians, the
chance of war should be greater in such cases, Fearon
contends.
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PROBLEMATIC ASSUMPTIONS
OF AUDIENCE COSTS THEORY
This audience costs framework and the hypotheses de-
duced from it depend on a few key assumptions, some
of them largely implicit in Fearon’s initial article. Here
we emphasize four that we find problematic in ways
that severely limit the power of the theory: (1) lead-
ers seek lock-in, not flexibility, (2) publics care a great
deal about consistency between threats and deeds, in-
dependent of their preferences on policy substance, (3)
domestic audience costs are substantial, independent
of other reputational considerations, and (4) targets
of threats understand domestic audience costs mecha-
nisms. We rely on these four assumptions as a bench-
mark to assess the empirical validity of audience costs
theory in our case studies, using the assumptions to
identify the causal mechanisms predicted by audience
costs theory.
Assumption 1: Leaders seek lock-in, not flexibility.
For audience costs to exert “crucial” effects on crisis
outcomes, threats must be reasonably clear and com-
pelling. If leaders simply warn that unspecified adverse
consequences might somehow follow at an unspecified
time if the opponent takes some ill-defined action, the
public will be unable to pin down the leader for incon-
sistency between word and deed.
In fact, historically grounded comparative research
suggests that international crises have rarely hinged on
bridge-burning ultimatums. When Glenn Snyder and
Paul Diesing (1977, 213–14) studied the use of threats
in twentieth-century crises, they found no instances of
“committing threats,” that is, of a threat that “creates
a commitment for the threatener that he did not have
before, via the engagement of additional values (honor,
resolve, reputation, etc.) that would be lost if the threat
were not fulfilled.” Rather than locking into a rigid
stance, leaders typically issued threats that retained
a degree of ambiguity regarding the time, place, and
nature of the response, as well as the specific actions
that would trigger it. When leaders issued unambiguous
ultimatums, it was almost always because they were
indeed resolved to fight and sometimes because they
sought to use the crisis diplomacy to justify attack-
ing (Jervis 1979, 303; Lebow 1981, 29–37; Snyder and
Diesing 1977, 215). Warnings of unspecified “grave
consequences” were far more common than threats
specifying explicit military sanctions, which risk en-
gaging the honor not only of the threatener but also
of the target (Snyder and Diesing 1977, 220). When
leaders did make threats, they left loopholes, as in
the Eisenhower–Dulles doctrine of responding to ag-
gression “at places and with means of our own choos-
ing” (Gaddis 1982, 121, 147; Snyder and Diesing 1977,
214, 216–18, 221). Pure bluffs were extremely rare and
couched in ambiguity.3
This preference for ambiguity stems from the very
nature of the role of threats in crisis bargaining, as
explained by Snyder and Diesing. Crises involving the
3 Snyder and Diesing (1977, 215) give the example of the German
threat to France in the Moroccan crisis of 1905.
risk of war are interactions under uncertainty in which
the parties test whether they can achieve their most
valued goals at an affordable price. In such interactions,
threats play the dual role of increasing the threatener’s
bargaining leverage by incurring potential reputational
costs for backing down and also of gathering infor-
mation about the other side’s willingness to run risks.
The goal of enhancing credibility militates in favor
of unambiguous threats, whereas the goals of prudent
information gathering and avoiding unnecessary wars
militate in favor of ambiguity. Leaders balance these
contradictory incentives in using threats in a crisis. If
leaders were to follow Schelling’s strategy and lock into
positions before learning more about the opponent’s
preferences and resolve, unnecessary wars would be
far more frequent.
Because leaders normally do hedge their threats,
they can usually escape the full ignominy of being
caught in a bluff, especially if the public otherwise
agrees with their policies. Threateners who want to
escape from a commitment may be able to reduce the
reputational costs of backing down by arguing that
the opponent’s action was not of the type covered
by the threat (e.g., they are not offensive missiles), that
the opponent’s concessions on other issues obviated
the need to act (they gave us part of Cameroon in ex-
change for Morocco), that the threat actually had been
carried out through low-cost actions (we boycotted
their Olympics), or that counteraction would be taken
in the future or through indirect means (we are increas-
ing our defense budget) (Snyder and Diesing 1977,
216). Especially if the opponent collaborates in helping
the bluffer save face, they can claim that the setback
is minor or limited (Hitler: “This is my last demand”),
that they are bowing to the opinion of neutral parties
(Eden deferring to Eisenhower over Suez), that the
change was rule-governed and not under duress (there
was a plebiscite in the Saar), or that the concession
is not a precedent because the situation is sui generis
(Snyder and Diesing 1977, 202–3). Thus, the combi-
nation of ambiguity in the original commitment and
creativity in justifying an escape from the commitment
may reduce audience costs substantially—and if this
loophole is foreseen, may circumscribe the bargaining
advantage of undertaking the ambiguous commitment.
In a follow-up article on signaling, Fearon himself
admits that “leaders often make statements or take ac-
tions that have ambiguous but potentially threatening
implications concerning future performance and then
back down later on” (1997, 83). Fearon interprets re-
treat following ambiguous threats as a form of bluffing
that “does not occur in equilibrium in the signaling
game” (1997, 83). This is “inconsistent with the model
in an interesting way,” he says, in that it points to other
considerations that weigh on the decision maker: e.g.,
the disadvantage of challenging the other side’s repu-
tation, a concern to avoid upsetting dovish audiences,
or the danger that hawkish allies might seize upon the
threat as a blank check allowing them to provoke a
fight. Regardless of the motivation for hedging threats,
our point is that the impact of audience costs diminishes
when threats are sufficiently vague that leaders cannot
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be held fully accountable for failures to carry them
out.
Assumption 2: Publics care a great deal about con-
sistency between threats and deeds, independent of their
preferences on policy substance. Audience costs theo-
rists invoke various justifications for the assumption
that domestic audiences care enough about empty
threats to try to remove or punish the leader. These
reasons include the leader’s tainted credibility or gen-
eral incompetence. Fearon himself proceeds from the
assumption that “shared expectations” will converge
on a “historical norm” that “seems to have domestic
political audiences punishing a leader who concedes
after having deployed troops more than one who con-
cedes outright” (Fearon 1994, 581).
If such a norm exists, why should it be decisive in
crisis deliberations? If, as Fearon argues, all public
information about capabilities and interests, includ-
ing the preferences of the leader’s own constituents,
has already been factored into the bargaining calculus
when the parties decide to engage in the crisis, such a
norm might seem to loom large in crisis deliberations.
But even within the logic of Fearon’s own framework,
private information about capabilities and interests can
affect crisis interactions. Indeed, audience costs come
into play in his framework because of the uncertainty
about relative bargaining power created by that pri-
vate information. Because of private information, or
because the public might not have fixed preferences at
the outset of a crisis, the leaders’ strategic assumptions
and preferences may diverge unpredictably from those
of the public to which they are accountable. The public
may turn out to be more hawkish or more dovish than
expected, and the public may care more about the sub-
stantive policy stakes than expected, relative to their
concern about the alleged norm against empty threats.
A more basic problem, however, is the highly re-
strictive conditions under which it is plausible that the
public would care more about a discrepancy between
a leader’s word and deed than about the substance
of the leader’s policy. For purposes of theory-building,
one might entertain the fiction that the direction and
intensity of the public’s ideologies, beliefs, mispercep-
tion, partisanship, cultural biases, parochial economic
interests, and all other sources of hawkish or dovish
preferences are somehow “taken into account” in the
decision to start the crisis. But if they are, that could
only mean that the leader has decided that those factors
are sufficiently supportive of making the threat in the
first place. Indeed, this comes close to the argument
made by Schultz, who stresses the need for support
by the opposition party to make a democratic leader’s
threats credible.4 In other words, publics are expected
to punish leaders who back away from threats only
if they agree with the threats on substantive grounds.
This claim diverges from Fearon’s original audience
costs theory. It also directly opposes Tomz’s research
4 Although Schultz’s argument is sometimes classified as an audi-
ence costs theory, he says that his argument “builds on this line of
reasoning to some degree, but it also departs from it in important
ways” (2001a, 18).
design, which assumes that domestic audience costs
and the public’s policy preferences are experimentally
separable.
Similarly, other scholars have theorized that account-
able leaders’ threats are seen as especially credible only
when their states already hold the upper hand in a crisis
because of their greater power or stake in the outcome
(Clare 2007). This seems plausible, but this, too, is a
long retreat from Fearon’s original conjecture that such
bargaining advantages have been factored out at the
moment the crisis starts, and it vastly diminishes the
scope of audience costs.
Assumption 3. Domestic audience costs are substan-
tial, independent of other reputational considerations.
Fearon is not simply arguing that publics care about
national honor. It may be true that leaders who fail
to confront opponents that encroach on their state’s
interests are likely to incur a cost to their personal
reputation and that of their state, but this can be true
whether or not they have made an explicit commitment
to resist the encroachment. As Schelling (1966, 118)
says, “unlike those sociable games it takes two to play,
with chicken it takes two not to play. If you are publicly
invited to play chicken and say you would rather not,
you have just played.” This is a broader reputational
concern that should not be confused with domestic au-
dience costs theory, which deals only with the tactical
use of threats in crisis to affect bargaining leverage.5
We find plenty of evidence that domestic audiences
care about national honor, but little evidence that they
care independently about empty threats.
Assumption 4. The targets of threats understand do-
mestic audience costs mechanisms and expect them to be
decisive. A final necessary assumption is that the states
that are the targets of attempts to manipulate audi-
ence costs in crises understand how this mechanism
works (Schultz 2001a, 18). At a minimum, an audience
costs account needs to show that the target looked for
information about the attitude of the threatener’s audi-
ence, assessed the likelihood that the threatener would
be punished for backing down, and assessed whether
the threatener felt vulnerable to such pressures. More
specifically, the target should believe that the likeli-
hood of punishment hinges on inconsistency between
the accountable leaders’ threats and deeds, rather than
on substantive policy differences between leaders and
their constituencies.
This assumption runs counter to the well-established
findings of cognitive psychologists and international
relations scholars who have applied their insights to
diplomatic interactions. They show that people tend
to see the other side as more unitary than it really is,
and that people view the opponent as acting out of
dispositional inclinations rather than under compul-
sion from situational constraints (Jervis 1976, 35–48,
319–42). Both of these tendencies limit the ability of
targets to perceive domestic audience costs dynamics
in democracies that threaten them. So do more prosaic
factors such as perceptual self-absorption and lack of
5 This parallels Jervis’s (2002, 305) distinction between reputation
and signaling reputation.
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knowledge about the threatening state (Jervis 1976,
343–55). Even remaining within a rationalist frame-
work, there is no reason to assume that authoritarian
targets will expect potential domestic audience costs to
trump other factors bearing on the credibility of threats,
such as the policy preferences of the opposition party
(as in Schultz’s theory) or private information about
the military balance and the attitude of allies (as in
other aspects of Fearon’s own theory).
Audience costs theory depends on simplifying as-
sumptions that underplay incentives that decisively
shape the choices of prudent leaders and publics. In
addition, cognitive biases, ideologies, and parochial
outlooks are likely to further erode domestic audience
costs effects in international crises.
PREVIOUS TESTS OF
AUDIENCE COSTS THEORY
Empirical tests of domestic audience costs theory have
so far consisted of quantitative analyses of interna-
tional disputes, survey-based experiments, and a hand-
ful of illustrative case studies. These testing efforts are
at best inconclusive because of causal inference prob-
lems, validity issues, and mixed empirical results.
One might think that the most direct and obvious
way to evaluate domestic audience costs theory would
be to check whether accountable leaders who back
down in crises suffer substantial domestic political pun-
ishment. One such test suggests that domestic audience
costs effects do not increase the punishment of demo-
cratic leaders (Gelpi and Grieco 2000). Audience costs
theorists, however, have argued that tests of this kind
do not take into account selection effects: Account-
able leaders tend to make only those threats that will
succeed, so audience costs may be a potent, but unob-
servable source of leverage in crisis bargaining (Schultz
2001b, 33). Although it is true that potential selection
effects need to be taken into account in any testing
strategy, this argument goes too far. First, the logic of
domestic audience costs theory depends on the leader
taking a risk of punishment, and if there is no risk, there
is no effect. Second, leaders sometimes do fail to carry
out their threats in a crisis, and the consequences of
those empty threats can in fact be observed.
To avoid inference problems caused by alleged se-
lection effects, the indirect strategy adopted by a num-
ber of statistical studies is to test whether states with
high potential audience costs, especially democracies
(or other accountable regimes), tend to prevail in
international coercive bargaining over low-audience-
costs states, such as authoritarian (or “personalistic”)
regimes. The typical problem confounding this strat-
egy, however, is the difficulty of isolating the effects
of domestic audience costs from other informational
mechanisms that might explain superior bargaining
outcomes for democracies. For example, better policy
analysis may allow democratic initiators to succeed in
international crisis bargaining because they are better
than others at picking the targets of their threats. Al-
ternatively, the greater transparency of the democratic
political process may make their threats more credible
(Schultz 1999, 245). Schultz’s statistical analysis of Cold
War and pre-Cold War crisis behavior (2001a) shows
that democratic leaders are generally loath to issue
irrevocably committing threats unless the opposition
party agrees with the substance of the policy. Thus,
democratic leaders’ threats are likely to succeed not
because the target realizes that the democratic leader’s
signaling credibility is at stake, but because the target
realizes that the democracy is united behind a policy
that makes sense in terms of the country’s power and
interests.
Other statistical tests are plagued by validity ques-
tions and mixed empirical results. For example,
Alexander Downes and Todd Sechser’s (2010) re-
view of prominent statistical studies (Eyerman and
Hart 1996; Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001; Partell and
Palmer 1999; Schultz 2001a) shows that the off-the-
shelf databases these studies use are swamped by a
large proportion of cases in which leaders make no
threats of the kind that would be relevant to audience
costs theory.
To surmount the selection and mechanism prob-
lems in observational studies of historical crisis out-
comes, Tomz (2007, 830–31) studies domestic audience
costs through experimentally manipulated surveys and
finds that domestic audience costs are high even when
respondents’ substantive policy views are taken into
account. He also offers direct evidence of causal mech-
anisms when he quotes the reasons for which respon-
dents in his survey said they disapproved of hypothet-
ical leaders who failed to follow through on threats
(2007, 835). As predicted by the theory, respondents
tended to remark on the leader’s inconsistency, tainted
credibility, and general incompetence. We look for sim-
ilar evidence in our historical cases. Notwithstanding
the rigorous design of Tomz’s experiment, the rele-
vance of his findings to the real world of politics is in
doubt (Barabas and Jerit 2010). In particular, we think
that the survey format makes the hypothetical leader’s
failure to carry out the threat salient to the respondent
in a way that is not necessarily true of real-world news
coverage.
Matthew Levendusky and Michael Horowitz (2009)
mimic Tomz’s experimental approach by using surveys
to gauge responses of U.S. audiences to hypothetical
scenarios in which a U.S. president makes a threat and
does not follow through. They find that the most impor-
tant factor affecting an audience’s decision to punish is
the ability of the president to control the information
the audience receives in the early stages of a foreign
policy crisis. This is especially the case when the presi-
dent can point to “new information” that made backing
down a prudent policy decision. When the president
is able to shape the public’s perception of the crisis,
“audience costs shrink dramatically” (2009, 3). Thus,
views of substantive policy costs trump concerns about
failure to carry out a threat.
In addition to looking for correlational evidence,
scholars have also suggested testing audience costs the-
ory by looking directly at causal mechanisms in histor-
ical crises. In such case studies, audience costs theory
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needs to show that the risk of domestic punishment
comes not from substantive policy disagreement be-
tween the public and the leader but from public dismay
at the leader’s empty threat. Empirically, this turns out
to be quite difficult to demonstrate, because audience
costs situations rarely arise when the public favors a
soft-line policy before the threat is made.
Schultz (2001b, 41), for example, offers some color-
ful quotations showing that observers thought that the
British government had locked itself into an uncompro-
mising negotiating position by publishing its hard-line
diplomatic correspondence during its 1898 showdown
with France over Fashoda. However, he also notes that
the British public was immediately “incensed” upon
learning of French encroachments on Britain’s posi-
tion on the Nile and demanded strong action, whereas
Prime Minister “Salisbury himself was inclined to be
more flexible.” Cabinet hard-liners, especially Joseph
Chamberlain, added to the pressure on Salisbury to
stand firm. Only then did Salisbury signal to the French
that his hands were tied by publishing the diplomatic
correspondence (Sanderson 1965, 320; Schultz 2001a,
182–88). Thus, hawkish public and cabinet policy pref-
erences, anchored in Britain’s massive naval superior-
ity and its perceived stake in protecting its colonial
lifeline through the Suez Canal, were firmly estab-
lished before Salisbury’s committing move. Hard-line
domestic preferences explain the bridge-burning com-
mitment, not vice versa, so the audience costs mecha-
nism is at best redundant.
In short, problems of causal inference, external va-
lidity, and mixed empirical results have bedeviled pre-
vious attempts to test domestic audience costs the-
ory. Process tracing of causal mechanisms in historical
crises, nearly absent among previous testing strategies,
can help overcome these problems if employed in a
methodologically self-aware manner.
LOOKING FOR EVIDENCE OF DOMESTIC
AUDIENCE COSTS PROCESSES
In historical process tracing, a “smoking gun” test in
favor of domestic audience costs theory would be one
in which the public was opposed to military action be-
fore a threat was issued and then explicitly punished
the leader for not following through with a threat with
which it disagreed. However, we could not find a clear-
cut case of this kind. Consequently, to distinguish the
effects of domestic policy disagreements from domestic
audience costs, we need to fall back on tracing causal
mechanisms in other kinds of cases. These include cases
that lead to the outcomes predicted by audience costs
theory, in which a democracy prevails over an authori-
tarian state, as well as cases with outcomes that are not
predicted by audience costs theory.
When a democratic leader issues a public threat, the
target can concede or resist; the threatener can then
stand firm or back down; and the target can subse-
quently stand firm or back down (Schultz 2001b, Fig-
ure 1, 37). According to domestic audience costs logic,
as the threatener’s ability to generate high audience
costs increases, the probability of the target resisting
the threatener decreases, and the probability of the
threatener standing firm increases; as the target’s abil-
ity to generate high audience costs increases, the proba-
bility of the threatener standing firm decreases, and the
probability of the target standing firm increases (2001b,
40). For Schultz, these results create selection prob-
lems wherein “the higher the [audience] costs, the less
likely they are observed” (2001b, 40). However, these
selection problems do not prevent us from carrying out
process tracing to see whether this logic is at work in
cases where leaders may have exposed themselves to
potential audience costs.
Our case selection includes examples that conform
to the outcome predicted by audience costs logic (the
authoritarian target of the democratic threat backs
down), as well as examples of deviations from that tra-
jectory. In the cases that reflect behavior anticipated by
audience costs theory, we look for evidence that the tar-
get backed down because of audience costs reasoning,
rather than for other reasons. For example, the threat
might have been credible and compelling because the
democracy enjoyed overwhelming military power and
had substantial interests engaged in the dispute, or be-
cause the domestic public was hawkish even before the
threat was issued. Later we discuss the Cuban missile
crisis as a case that seems superficially to lie on the
outcome path predicted by audience costs theory, but in
which key causal mechanisms deviate from the theory’s
expectations and support other explanations.
There are three ways in which a deviation from
the audience costs trajectory can occur, with each
deviation increasingly problematic for audience costs
theory:
1. The nondemocratic target stands firm in response
to the democratic challenger’s threat (our example
is the Sino-Indian War).
2. The democratic threatener backs down when the
nondemocratic target stands firm and is punished
by the domestic audience (the Iran hostage crisis).
3. The democratic threatener backs down when the
nondemocratic target stands firm and is not pun-
ished by the domestic audience (the Suez crisis).
Why might these unpredicted trajectories occur? In
the first of these scenarios, the prospect of war might
fail to deter authoritarians who think the threat to fight
is credible, but believe that the democracy is too weak
militarily or diplomatically to prevail in the fight, or
who think that the democracy’s stake in the struggle is
small and so it will quit after sustaining a few military
setbacks. Another possibility is that the authoritarian
thinks the democratic leader is bluffing and will not
fight. The authoritarian might reach this conclusion for
any of several reasons: The democracy’s underlying
power and interests seem insufficient to warrant car-
rying out the threat; public opinion in the democracy
is too dovish to support carrying out the threat; the
democratic leader has made a threat that is too im-
precise or weak to generate sufficient audience costs;
the democratic leader seems firmly in power and is
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therefore impervious to audience costs; or the author-
itarian leader does not understand how audience costs
work. If any or all of these reasons were found to
be prevalent in a significant proportion of cases, they
would cast doubt on audience costs theory’s claim to
be a powerful, general explanation for democratic suc-
cesses in crisis bargaining.
Also unpredicted by audience costs theory would
be the democratic leader’s failure to carry out the
committing threat if the authoritarian state failed to
comply, despite the risk that he might then be pun-
ished. Why might this occur? One reason could be
that a lame duck leader—or one who is domestically
invulnerable—does not care if punishment follows be-
ing caught in a bluff. This does not undermine the core
logic of audience costs theory, but if such situations
are common, it would circumscribe its relevance. A
second possibility is that the leader erroneously thinks
he can escape severe punishment because the threat
was vague, leaving loopholes that might permit the
evasion of accountability. This undermines audience
costs theory if it happens frequently enough. A third
possibility is that the leader intended to carry out the
threat, but new information came to light that carrying
out the threat would be much costlier than anticipated.
This is a substantive policy consideration that erodes
the power of audience costs theory. Even if the public
does punish the bluffer, an audience costs explanation
needs to show that the cause was the bluffing per se
rather than the policy preferences of the public. For
example, a hawkish public that wanted to use force
even before the threat was made might punish the
leader for diverging from its preferred policy, whereas a
dovish public might punish the leader for having made
what it considered an unwise threat in the first place.
Finally, a failure to punish the democratic leader’s
called bluff would be even further off the path pre-
dicted by audience costs theory. This could happen
because the audience considered the bluff a smart,
low-cost tactic (Walt 1999); because substantive pol-
icy considerations outweighed the public’s dismay at
getting caught in an empty threat; because the domes-
tic audience did not care about the issue at stake; or
because the leader’s threat was vague. Any of these, if
common enough, would raise doubts about the potency
of audience costs theory.6
Any evaluation of a failure to punish requires a
counterfactual inference: Even if the leader’s standing
did not decline after an empty threat, would it have
been higher had he not failed to follow through on
the threat? The counterfactual needs to assess whether
other favorable trends, such as economic improve-
ments unrelated to the crisis, buoyed the leader’s status
and thus masked the effect of the punishment. We con-
sider these factors when assessing the leader’s approval
rating.
6 “When . . . backing down is best for a state, most leaders and domes-
tic audiences should support it. However, when war is best for the
state, most members of both categories should favor it. In neither case
do domestic audiences as a group have a reason to punish leaders,”
says Sartori (2005, 50).
One particular escape route from punishment, an
appeal to changed circumstances, requires further dis-
cussion. A leader who wants to back away from a threat
could explain to his public that the threat was appropri-
ate when it was made, but changed circumstances had
made carrying it out imprudent or unnecessary. Per-
haps the opponent had become too strong to resist in
the disputed location, or perhaps the opponent’s ruling
coalition had switched from one with unlimited aims to
one with limited aims, such that the concession would
have no broader implications. Or perhaps the threat
was issued based on erroneous information. For ex-
ample, the Reagan Administration backed away from
a threat to Nicaragua after realizing that the Soviets
were not actually sending MiG fighter aircraft there.
Audience costs theory, focusing on inconsistency be-
tween word and deed, would presumably expect the
public to take a dim view of appeals to changed cir-
cumstances, feeling that the leader should not have
undertaken unequivocal commitments in such fluid
circumstances. In contrast, a perspective emphasizing
substantive policy preferences would expect the public
to breathe a sigh of relief to learn that the leader was
not going to follow through with what had become an
imprudent commitment (Slantchev 2006, 449). If lead-
ers can easily escape from audience costs by claiming
changed circumstances, this does not necessarily refute
the theory, but it seriously limits its scope.
SCOPE CONDITIONS
Audience costs theorists have tended to make narrow
scope claims with respect to the range of threats and
commitments that the theory addresses, and so do we.7
Audience costs literature generally focuses on specific
threats or displays of force undertaken during a cri-
sis interaction, rather than public commitments made
well in advance of the crisis. The existence of the crisis
shows prima facie that previous commitments were in-
sufficient to deter the challenge, so new, more credible
threats are needed to prevail in crisis bargaining.
Explicit verbal threats and implicit threats arising
from shows of military force are both seen as creating
potential audience costs. We will consider both. Some
studies also portray limited use of force as generat-
ing even larger potential audience costs if the leader
later withdraws from the fight without going all out to
win it (Tomz 2007, 828). Although we see the logic
in this, we also worry about stretching the concept
of audience costs to apply to any conflict involving
sunk costs. One problem with this extension is that any
use of force beyond the merely symbolic is likely to
yield information about the probable success of using
military power to defeat the adversary. In this situa-
tion, it might be difficult to distinguish an empty threat
from Bayesian updating leading to withdrawal from a
7 Fearon (1997, 85–86) explores the impact of audiences on the cred-
ibility of alliance commitments in a broader analysis of “tying hands”
strategies. Audience costs theory generally treats threats differently
from promises. Without taking a position on this, we will look only
at threats here.
443
The Cost of Empty Threats August 2011
disadvantageous fight. For that reason, we will examine
cases that involve uses of force that are too limited to
provide significant information about the likely out-
come of more extensive fighting.
Limited uses of force that only partially carry out a
verbal threat raise an important question of interpreta-
tion. Such actions might be seen as mitigating audience
costs on the grounds that the leader made some effort
to fulfill the threat, even if the actions did not achieve
the stated purpose of the threat. However, we follow
Fearon and Tomz in turning that view on its head. Dis-
plays of force that fail to compel compliance simply
add to the leader’s reputational exposure, according to
the logic of the theory.
CASE SELECTION
We used Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000) as our primary
source to identify cases of democratic states that issued
threats to authoritarian states in the period after 1945,
for which public opinion data are often available.8 To
facilitate our case selection process, we coded all of
the Brecher and Wilkenfeld post-1945 crises involv-
ing the United States according to the clarity of the
threat, including whether the threat was accompanied
by a show or use of force, and the outcome of the
interaction. A table showing our coding of these cases
is available in a supplemental online Appendix (at
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/psr2011013).9 We
similarly surveyed the Brecher and Wilkenfeld cases
involving other democracies in a qualitative manner.
We double-checked with the Militarized Interstate Dis-
putes dataset (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004) to
make sure we had not missed any crises.
In choosing cases for more detailed research, we
looked in particular for cases that should be easy for
domestic audience costs theory to explain, according
to two main criteria. First, we looked for cases that
involved a clear ultimatum, especially in combination
with a show of force. In these cases, there can be little
doubt that the audience costs mechanism should have
been engaged. The Suez crisis of 1956 is the clearest
case by this criterion. Second, we looked for cases that
on the surface exhibited domestic political processes
that seemed promising for an audience costs narrative.
Specifically, we looked for any cases in which a con-
cern about national credibility or honor was voiced
in public discourse, domestic public opinion pressed
the leader to stand firm, the prudence of the leader’s
threat became a subject for domestic political discus-
sion, decision makers privately worried that they would
be punished for backing away from their threats, the
leader was punished for showing weakness in the crisis,
8 The relevant democracies were mainly the United States, United
Kingdom, and France (for which we have fairly systematic public
opinion data) and India and Israel (for which we generally do not).
9 Note that the purpose of this coding effort was not to create a
database suitable for statistical analysis, but rather to aid in identify-
ing potential cases for process-tracing in case studies. Our coding of
the nature of the threat is not an ordinal measure of exposure to au-
dience costs, and cannot be used to assess audience costs hypotheses
without considering other contextual factors.
or scholarly accounts argued that the leader became
trapped into standing firm as a result of his or her own
threatening rhetoric.
Based on these criteria, we provide narratives here
for the most plausible cases in favor of audience costs
theory. In particular, we use these narratives to assess
whether audience costs mechanisms were in fact sig-
nificant once we take the public’s substantive policy
preferences into account. The Sino-Indian war of 1962
is the strongest case for audience costs theory by this
criterion. The Cuban missile crisis and the Iran hostage
crisis are ambiguous and worthy of detailed discussion.
Our four main cases also happen to illustrate the four
trajectories of threat and response discussed earlier, in-
cluding the path predicted by audience costs theory and
three deviant paths. However, the cases were chosen
because they are the strongest cases for audience costs
theory, not because they are illustrative of these various
trajectories. We also briefly mention a few other crises
to illustrate the broader range of cases that follow the
four trajectories.
One possible source of bias in our pool of cases is the
prominent role of the United States, an uncommonly
powerful actor that tends to get its way when it makes
threats and tends to carry out the threat when it does
not. The United States was involved in 54 crises during
the period we surveyed, more than twice the number
of the next most crisis-prone democracy. U.S. power
advantages might make it harder to demonstrate the
decisive effect of audience costs on crisis outcomes, be-
cause power considerations and audience costs would
often point in the same direction. Moreover, the United
States’s overwhelming capability might make it unnec-
essary to use audience costs tactics, because its military
threats automatically carry considerable credibility.
But many cases remain untainted by these problems.
The Soviet Union constituted an imposing foe to the
United States in several crises. In addition, the domain
of cases also includes numerous weaker democracies
that did not always get their way. Finally, these post-
1945 cases should be assessed against the backdrop of
our summary of the findings of Snyder and Diesing’s
study, which included many pre-1945 crises in which
the democracies were not militarily dominant.
For each case, we address issues that correspond to
the four assumptions of domestic audience costs theory
that we questioned earlier: (1) whether threats were
unambiguous enough to generate potential audience
costs for the leader, (2) whether any domestic punish-
ment or discussion of possible punishment of the leader
was based on unfulfilled threats or on policy disagree-
ments, (3) whether the public’s reputational concerns
were related to unfulfilled threats, and (4) whether the
foreign target of the threat assessed and understood
the potential for audience costs. In evaluating domestic
punishment, we ask whether the leader or the leader’s
party suffered a setback in elections or public opinion
surveys. To assess the reasons for punishment, we look
at opinion surveys, legislative speeches, and commen-
tary in major newspapers, systematically covering at
least some of these sources during the period before,
during, and after the crisis. We take into account the
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possibility that rising approval on other issues might
mask punishment for empty threats.
WEAK FOLLOW-THROUGH ON A
THREAT—NO AUDIENCE COSTS PAID: SUEZ
Audience costs theorists have not offered examples of
called bluffs leading to domestic punishment of demo-
cratic leaders. Such cases, if they exist at all, are scarce
in part because rational leaders generally avoid bla-
tant bluffing. The Suez crisis, however, offers a rare
opportunity to observe what happens when democratic
leaders fail to follow through effectively on an unam-
biguous ultimatum that is defied by an authoritarian
target. British and French leaders were not punished by
domestic opinion, largely because the average citizen
was in general agreement with their policies except
for the ultimatum. Even critics of those policies failed
to emphasize the discrepancy between the threat and
weak subsequent actions.
Clarity and Implementation of Threat
In the 1956 Suez crisis, the leaders of Britain and France
issued an ultimatum to Egyptian President Gamal Ab-
del Nasser to reverse his seizure of the canal, were de-
fied by Egypt, briefly undertook inconclusive military
operations in the canal area, and quickly withdrew. The
crisis was triggered when the United States and Great
Britain reneged on their commitment to financially as-
sist Nasser in building the Aswan Dam following large
Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt. In response, on July
26, 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which
had been leased to the French- and British-owned Suez
Canal Corporation (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000, 275–
76). Conservative Prime Minister Anthony Eden and
the British cabinet, concerned about the security of oil
supplies and trade, decided to restore Western control
of the canal by force, if necessary, hoping to use the
invasion as an opportunity to depose Nasser (Fursenko
and Naftali 2006, chap. 4; Neustadt 1970, 12). In France,
the Socialist government of Prime Minister Guy Mol-
let, fearing that Nasser’s bold stroke would encourage
the Algerian national liberation movement, likewise
decided on a forceful response, secretly inviting Israel
to invade the Egyptian Sinai to provide Britain and
France with a pretext to seize the canal. When multilat-
eral negotiations failed to resolve the issue, the British,
French, and Israelis pressed ahead with their secret
plan, despite warnings from President Eisenhower and
Secretary of State Dulles that the United States would
not support the use of force against Nasser (Neustadt
1970, 12–13).
On October 29, 1956, the Israelis invaded the Sinai
Peninsula, prompting an Anglo-French ultimatum call-
ing on the Israelis and Egyptians to order their forces to
withdraw ten miles from the Suez Canal within 12 hours
and demanding that Egypt allow British and French
forces to temporarily occupy positions guarding the
canal. In the case of a failure to comply, British and
French forces would intervene in “whatever strength
may be necessary to secure compliance” (Times of
London, October 31, 1956). On October 31 the British
and French forces bombed Egyptian airfields and af-
ter several days established only a small ground pres-
ence at the northern end of the canal (Coles 2006,
100–18; Epstein, 1960, 201–24; Neustadt 1970, 24–25).
Egypt appealed for help to the Soviets, who threatened
missile attacks against London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.
Eisenhower sent Secretary of the Treasury George
Humphrey to insist that the British immediately halt
operations in Egypt, or else the United States would
bar British access to U.S. dollars from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and deny British credit from the
Export–Import Bank at a time when the pound sterling
was already in jeopardy (Neustadt 1970, 26). Following
the U.S. threat, the British and French immediately
decided to declare a cease-fire and began withdrawing
their forces on November 6, 1956 (Brecher and Wilken-
feld 2000, 276). A United Nations Peacekeeping Force
was sent to Egypt to supervise the withdrawal.
Domestic Punishment and Criticism
Eden, Mollet, and their governments suffered little do-
mestic punishment for failing to follow through on their
threat. Their public approval ratings remained roughly
constant during and after the crisis, and public surveys
showed majority agreement with their policies, except
that the British public opposed an ultimatum and a
military seizure of the canal. After the crisis, Mollet
remained in office. Eden stepped down for compelling
health reasons in January 1957, replaced by his cabi-
net colleague Harold Macmillan (Pearson 2003, 173).
In the next general election in 1959, the Conservative
party increased the size of their majority despite inef-
fectual attempts by Labour and the Liberals to revive
the Suez issue (Beloff 1989, 333; Epstein 1964, 170–71;
Fry 2005, 154; Kunz 1991, 142).
Criticism of Eden focused mainly on his poor judg-
ment in putting Britain in an untenable position in the
first place—not on failing to persist in this mistake—
and on lying to Parliament about collusion with Israel’s
attack on Egypt (Carlton 1988, 92–93). The dovish
Labour opposition criticized Eden for the substance of
his policy, not for failing to carry out his threat. A hawk-
ish minority within the Conservative party did criticize
the failure to follow through with military action, but on
specific policy grounds, not because it would tarnish the
credibility of British threats in general, and it remained
supportive of the Conservative government.
Before the ultimatum to Nasser, British public opin-
ion largely supported the British government’s han-
dling of the crisis, which included various economic
and political sanctions as well as participation in in-
ternational conferences to resolve the crisis. In Au-
gust 1956, 59% of British respondents indicated that
they approved of the government’s overall handling
of the Suez problem.10 An overwhelming majority of
10 All British public opinion data come from Gallup (1976a and
1976b).
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respondents (ranging from 65 to 93%) approved var-
ious steps taken by the British government, includ-
ing freezing Egyptian sterling credit, recalling reserve
forces, strengthening forces in the Mediterranean, cut-
ting off British arms shipments to Egypt, and calling
for an international conference. However, when asked
what action the British government should take against
Egypt if the conferences failed, only 33% of respon-
dents favored military action, 47% favored economic
and political action, and 20% did not know. Of the 33%
who urged military action, an overwhelming majority
(27%) supported military action even without Ameri-
can support. Public skepticism about the use of force
continued in September: 65% of British respondents
said France and Britain should not have taken military
action against Egypt immediately when Nasser seized
the canal. Asked whether Britain should “give Egypt
an ultimatum that unless she agrees to our proposals
we will send in troops to occupy the Canal,” 49% of
respondents disapproved, whereas 34% approved.
The British public disapproved of carrying out the
October 30 ultimatum with military force when Nasser
failed to comply with its terms. On November 1–2, 44%
of respondents thought Britain was wrong to take mili-
tary action in Egypt, whereas 37% approved. Following
the announcement of a cease-fire, British public opin-
ion expressed approval of Eden and his policies. On
November 10–11, 53% said they “agree with the way
Eden has handled the Middle-East situation” (Epstein
1964, 143). With the safety of hindsight in December
1956, after the cease-fire but before Eden’s resigna-
tion, 49% of respondents retrospectively indicated they
thought Britain had been “right to take military ac-
tion in Egypt,” whereas 36% thought Britain had been
“wrong.” Nonetheless, 53% said it was right to accept
the cease-fire, whereas only 34% said the military oper-
ation should have continued. The Guardian noted with
irony that “the Government gained credit for having
stopped a war” (November 15, 1956).
Policy preferences, not general concerns about threat
credibility, motivated critics on the left and the right. In
the House of Lords, some expressed the opinion that
the ultimatum “was a tragic mistake, almost incompre-
hensible, because at a time when unity was wanted it
had split the nation more bitterly and more completely
than it had been split before.” The context made clear,
however, that the objection was not to the discrep-
ancy between word and deed, but to the policy of force
(“Peers’ Views on Suez,” The Times, Wednesday, De-
cember 12, 1956).
On the eve of a December 6 confidence vote, the
Labour Party criticized the prudence and legality of
the Conservative government’s policy of force, not its
failure to follow through on the threat (“Suez With-
drawal Debate,” The Times, Saturday, December 1,
1956). The government easily survived the vote, though
15 Tories abstained. These were a hard core of hawkish
backbenchers who had favored hard-line policies from
the beginning of the crisis (“Back-Benchers Fear of
Weakening,” The Times, Friday, November 30, 1956).
Some hawkish Conservatives may have gently pushed
Eden to resign (Beloff 1989, 320–22; Pearson 2003,
167–68; Rothwell 1992, 236–37), but most Conserva-
tives believed that Eden had adequately stood up for
Britain’s interests (Thorpe 2003, 542–44).
Schultz’s excellent short case study of the Suez crisis
correctly argues that Eden’s threats lacked credibil-
ity in part because of Labour’s vocal opposition to
them (216–22). This supports his theory, which em-
phasizes the centrality of substantive policy views. It
counts against Fearon’s audience costs theory, because
Labour’s sharp criticism started when the threat was
issued, not when it was abandoned.
Some might ask whether the British leaders were
not punished because they did partially carry out their
ultimatum. This is unconvincing on grounds of both
theory and facts. Tomz (2007, 828) correctly argues that
an inadequate, token use of force increases the leader’s
exposure to audience costs. Indeed, none of the British
argued that the half-hearted military operation had
successfully carried out the threat. A memorandum is-
sued by Macmillan before Eden’s resignation captured
the mood well: “Suez had been a gamble which failed.
Now we must go on as if it never happened” (Pearson
2003, 168).
Even more than the British government, the French
government was doubly immune from domestic audi-
ence costs. In July 1956, before Nasser nationalized the
canal, 29% of French respondents were satisfied with
Mollet as President of the Council, a figure that rose
to 39% by March 1957. Mollet was not punished for
failing to follow through effectively on the ultimatum
because he was covered on both flanks. The majority
of the French public was disinclined to use force in
the first place, and the minority who wanted to use
force could not blame Mollet, who would have been
willing to continue military operations in Egypt had
it not been for the unilateral decision of the British
cabinet to withdraw (Neustadt 1970, 28).11
Throughout the crisis, French public opinion was on
the whole more supportive of political and diplomatic
action than of the use of military force. When asked
during the London Conference of September 1956
what would be the best solution to the crisis, a plurality
of respondents (41%) preferred to “entrust to an inter-
national authority both the management of the Canal
and control of the navigation.” Only 28% believed the
solution should be forcibly imposed. When asked what
to do if Egypt did not accept the decisions taken at
the London Conference, 49% of French respondents
expressed support for economic and political measures,
whereas 20% supported military action. Three-fourths
of the latter group indicated that they would support
military action even if the United States did not support
France and Britain. Notwithstanding the limited public
support for the use of force, the French parliament was
more supportive of the ultimatum and military action
(Times of London, Wednesday, October 3, 1956). After
11 On November 6 a majority of the British Cabinet resolved to
accept the cease-fire, and Eden was pressured to acquiesce. When
Eden called Mollet to inform him of Britain’s decision, Mollet was
upset at the decision and wanted to press forward with the offensive,
but lacked the military capacity to carry on alone (Kunz 1991, 133).
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the withdrawal, Mollet’s government easily prevailed
in a vote of confidence, 325 to 210, in the National
Assembly.
Reputational Concerns
The British public and media commentators viewed the
nationalization of the canal as a challenge to Britain’s
national honor and prestige weeks before Eden’s ulti-
matum (Kunz 1991, 77–78). The Manchester Guardian
opined that “It is the further weakening of Western
prestige in the Middle East rather than the disposition
of the canal . . . which is the more serious consequence
of these recent transactions” (July 28, 1956). An August
1956 survey found that 23% of respondents thought
that past British weakness was to blame for the canal
crisis. Insofar as reputation mattered, it took the form
of substantive concern about the trend of national
power and policy, not formalistic concern over con-
sistency between words and deeds. The British public
was concerned about national reputation regardless of
Eden’s ultimatum.
Reputational costs also played a role in the French
public’s reaction to the crisis. These international rep-
utational concerns focused on the weakness of French
policy in facing Arab challenges in general, not on
the domestic audience costs of failing to carry out
threats. Explicitly drawing an analogy to “the Munich
syndrome,” the French press and politicians argued
that weakness on the Suez issue would undermine
France’s credibility in dealing with rebellions in North
Africa. Mollet himself made public comparisons be-
tween Nasser and Hitler (Vaisse 1989, 134–35). The
public shared this view. In September 1956, 58% of
respondents indicated that the Suez crisis had a “very
important” impact on the situation in Algeria, whereas
only 7% believed it had no effect. Fifty percent of
respondents believed the crisis also had an impor-
tant effect on the relationship between France and
Tunisia and Morocco. However, the public’s other pol-
icy concerns outweighed these reputational concerns.
Although the public worried about the reputational
consequences of retreats, they saw military interven-
tion as unwise.
Target’s Assessment of
Domestic Audience Costs
Schultz argues convincingly that the Labour Party’s op-
position to the use of force undermined the credibility
of the Anglo-French ultimatum in Nasser’s eyes (2001a,
220). Nasser’s adviser Mohammed Heikal has written
vividly of Nasser’s reaction to films of a mass antiwar
rally in Trafalgar Square, which led him to cancel plans
to go into hiding and fight a guerrilla war (1986, 195).
This supports Schultz’s theory about the crucial role of
opposition support in making democratic threats cred-
ible, and it contradicts Fearon’s audience costs theory,
because Eden’s accountability to the public made his
threats less credible. There is no evidence that Nasser
took audience costs considerations into account when
responding to the Anglo-French ultimatum.
In short, the Suez Canal crisis represents a partic-
ularly clear case calling into question the efficacy of
audience costs. The British and French publics did not
punish Eden and Mollet despite their failure to fol-
low through effectively on their very clear ultimatum.
Rather, because both publics were reluctant to use
force, they preferred their leaders’ policies of backing
away from the ultimatum. Criticism of the withdrawal
came only from the faction that was already hawkish
before the ultimatum was issued.
WEAK FOLLOW-THROUGH ON A
THREAT—DOMESTIC POLICY COSTS PAID:
IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS
In the Iran hostage crisis, President Jimmy Carter
threatened to use military force unless Iranian students
released U.S. diplomats in Teheran, and Iran failed
to comply. The United States initiated an aborted at-
tempt to use military force to rescue the hostages, but
Carter made no subsequent attempts to make good
on his threat. Carter was punished by his domestic
audience, though, for the weakness and incompetence
of his policy in general, not because of a discrepancy
between threats and actions. The public turned hawk-
ish before Carter did and pushed Carter into making
threats that he was reluctant to implement. Notwith-
standing Carter’s poor standing in approval surveys
and defeat by the more hawkish Ronald Reagan in the
1980 presidential election, we find little evidence that
this punishment conforms to the logic of audience costs
theory.
Clarity and Implementation of Threat
Following the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran
by Iranian students on November 4, 1979, the Carter
administration initially rejected the use of force to com-
pel the release of the hostages (Saunders 1985, 73).
The New York Times quoted an administration official
on November 5 as saying, “Since we don’t have the
Shadow or Superman in our employ, any force would
be crazy.” However, Carter himself warned of “grave
consequences” if the hostages were harmed or put on
trial (Los Angeles Times, Nov. 24) and sent an aircraft
carrier to the Arabian Sea. “U.S. honor is at stake in
Iran and is more important than the lives of the 49
Americans hostages held there,” Carter said in a White
House briefing (Los Angeles Times, Nov. 24).12 “Other
actions which I might decide to take would come in
the future after those peaceful means have been ex-
hausted,” Carter said ambiguously. “This nation will
never yield to blackmail.” (New York Times, November
28, 1979).
Domestic public opinion was initially supportive of
Carter’s approach, but turned hawkish well before he
12 The wording of Carter’s statement in this briefing was reiterated to
the newspaper by a Congressman and is thus not a direct quotation
of Carter’s briefing.
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issued threats of military action to compel release of
the hostages in April 1980.13 In November, 71% of
respondents agreed that Carter “is doing all he can to
free the Americans being held hostage in the U.S. Em-
bassy in Iran,” (NBC News/Associated Press survey,
November 27–28) and in December, 76% of respon-
dents approved of the way Carter was handling the
crisis (Gallup, December 7–10). At this stage, the pub-
lic overwhelmingly disapproved of military solutions to
the crisis: 70% of respondents opposed a U.S. policy of
bombing the main Iranian oil terminal if Iran put the
U.S. hostages on trial, and 65% disapproved of a res-
cue attempt (ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates,
November 26–29). Carter’s overall approval rating in-
creased from 32% just before the hostage taking to
61% in early December (New York Times, December
10).
Nonetheless, criticism from hawks was gradually
building. In December 1979, 48% thought Carter had
been “tough enough” on Iran, but 47% said he had
not been tough enough (Chicago Tribune, December
24). Beginning in January 1980, public opinion became
increasingly hawkish and began to shift against Carter:
58% of respondents indicated that Carter should have
taken stronger actions to end the crisis (CBS News/New
York Times, January 9–13). In March, 49% believed
Carter’s handling of the crisis had been a failure,
whereas only 33% believed it had been a success (ABC
News/Louis Harris and Associates, March 5–8); 60%
believed stronger action should have been taken to
free the hostages (CBS News/New York Times, March
12–15); 45% agreed that “it is time to do whatever is
necessary . . . even if it involves military action,” com-
pared to 44% who disagreed (NBC News/Associated
Press, March 20–21).
This increased public support for a military solution
helped to push Carter toward making further public
threats. By April 1980, says Harold Saunders (140),
“a feeling pervaded the administration that the pa-
tience of the American people was running out and
that firm and decisive steps had to be taken.” On April
7, Carter cut off diplomatic relations with Iran, issued a
full embargo, froze Iranian assets in the United States,
cancelled Iranian visas, and expelled Iranian diplomats.
The public, however, did not believe those additional
moves would be sufficient to end the crisis: 51% be-
lieved those actions were not tough enough (Newsweek
and Gallup Organization, April 9–10); 77% believed
“it was a big mistake not to give Iran an ultimatum
in the first 72 hours after the hostages were seized”;
51% approved of a military strike against Iran if the
hostages were put on trial, “even if it might endanger
the lives of the hostages” (ABC News/Louis Harris and
Associates, April 8).
On April 17, Carter announced a new set of eco-
nomic sanctions and issued a public threat to the Ira-
13 Survey results are from searches of the iPOLL Databank and
from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of
Connecticut. We read all stories in all U.S. newspapers from Novem-
ber 4, 1979, to February 1, 1981, with the words “Iran,” “hostage,”
and “Carter,” as searched for in the ProQuest historical newspapers
archives.
nians: “If this additional set of sanctions that I’ve
described to you today, and the concerted action of
our allies, is not successful, then the only next step
available that I can see would be some sort of mili-
tary action, which is the prerogative and the right of
the United States under these circumstances” (New
York Times, April 17, 1980). Carter added, “The Au-
thorities in Iran should realize that the availability of
peaceful measures—like the patience of the American
people—is running out” (Chicago Tribune, April 18,
1980). Notwithstanding potential audience costs, these
threats failed, and on April 24 the rescue mission was
launched.
It is unclear whether the rescue attempt should be
seen as fulfilling Carter’s vague threat to take military
action. In a nationally televised address on April 25,
Carter said, “the mission on which they were embarked
was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against
Iran” (New York Times, April 26, 1980). This suggests
Carter was distinguishing between the rescue attempt
and a military response, which never occurred. Carter
had previously said that mining Iranian ports seemed to
be the most viable military option (Sick 1985, 145–46).
Even if one asserts that the “humanitarian” mission
was in fact a military response, the fact that Carter
halted the mission before it could fulfill its stated goal
exposed Carter to potential audience costs for having
failed to follow through on a threat.
Domestic Punishment and Criticism
In the immediate aftermath of the aborted rescue at-
tempt, the hawkish public supported the policy but
criticized Carter’s incompetence in carrying it out: 65%
believed the United States should have attempted the
rescue mission earlier (CBS News, April 26–27); 70%
of American believed the “U.S. was right to have tried
the rescue attempt and should try again”; 62% rated
Carter negatively “on his handling of the hostages situ-
ation”; and 72% rated Carter negatively “on his ability
to ‘get things done’” (Boston Globe, April 27).
Carter’s approval ratings continued to fall. In June
1980, 74% of respondents rated Carter negatively on
his handling of the crisis (ABC News/Louis Harris and
Associates, June 5–9). In October, 38% of respondents
believed Reagan would do more to get the hostages
out of Iran, compared to the 29% who believed Carter
would do more (Time and Yankelovich, Skelly, and
White, October 14–16). In December 1980, 56% of
respondents agreed with the statement, “Right after
the hostages were seized, the U.S. should have given
Iran an ultimatum to give back the hostages by a certain
day, and then taken direct military action against Iran,
even if this might have endangered the lives of the
hostages” (ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates,
December 3–6). In January 1981, 71% of respondents
agreed that “Iran released United States hostages this
week because they were afraid of dealing with Ronald
Reagan as President” (NBC News/Associated Press,
January 21–23).
448
American Political Science Review Vol. 105, No. 3
In the November 1980 Presidential election, 8% of
voters said their choice had been affected primarily by
the hostage issue (Roper, November 15–23). Whatever
punishment Carter received as a result of his Iran policy
needs to be considered in the context of his low general
approval rating before the crisis, continuing displeasure
with his stewardship of the economy, and the probably
mixed effect of the Soviets’ December 1979 invasion of
Afghanistan, which at least briefly boosted his reputa-
tion for the perceived toughness of his response (New
York Times, January 16, 1980).
Reputational Concerns
There is no question that Carter’s domestic audience
punished him for his handling of the crisis, but there is
very limited evidence that this had to do with any mis-
match between Carter’s words and deeds. Rather, the
public disapproved of Carter because they had more
hawkish policy preferences and because they were dis-
mayed by the reputational costs of failing to redress
the hostage taking, irrespective of Carter’s statements.
During the course of the crisis, the public did be-
come concerned with the consequences for U.S. na-
tional honor, but because of the inherently humili-
ating situation, not because of unfulfilled threats per
se (Saunders 1985, 87). At the beginning of the cri-
sis, the public was evenly divided about the impact of
the crisis on national honor: 26% believed the crisis
caused the world to have less respect for the United
States, 30% believed it caused the world to have more
respect for the United States, and 38% believed there
was no change (Newsweek and Gallup, December 5–
6, 1979). As the crisis progressed the answers became
significantly more negative. In early April 1980, before
Carter’s ultimatum, 71% agreed that “Up to now, the
U.S. has been at the mercy of the Ayatollah, making
us look weak and helpless” (ABC News/Louis Harris
and Associates, April 8). In December 1980, 70% con-
tinued to agree with that statement (ABC News/Louis
Harris and Associates, December 3–6). On October
29, 1980 the Wall Street Journal reported that Rea-
gan’s strongest question to Carter in the candidates’
debate had been, “Is America respected throughout
the world?”
These were concerns about reputational costs, but
not audience costs per se. We found no direct com-
plaints about discrepancies between Carter’s threats
toward Iran and his actions. Polls did not ask that pre-
cise question. Carter’s political opponents did claim,
however, that his foreign policy in general was “incon-
sistent.” Complaining that Carter had not invested in
sufficient naval might to back up his diplomacy against
Iran, Republican National Committee chairman Bill
Brock said that Carter had been “scabbard-rattling
in the last couple of weeks, but without anything in
the scabbard.” George H.W. Bush likewise hoped that
Carter was not “bluffing” beyond his military means
(New York Times, January 20 and 30). But these were
points made in policy debates about defense budgets,
and not evidence of audience costs in Fearon’s sense.
Moreover, when respondents were forced to choose
between specific policy costs and diffuse reputational
costs, they tended to care more about the former.
Asked in December 1980 whether it was “more im-
portant . . . to preserve the lives of the 52 hostages or
to preserve the honor of the United States,” 52% said
the lives of the hostages (Louis Harris, December 3–
6). This preference order was reversed only when the
question was posed in a way that created a presumption
that no policy had any hope of securing the hostages
(ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates, April 8).
Target’s Assessment of
Domestic Audience Costs
Although Carter’s public threats failed to compel the
Iranians to release the hostages, earlier threats, includ-
ing private ones, of “extremely grave” consequences
if the hostages were harmed or put on trial do seem
to have been effective. To back up those deterrent
threats, Carter sent the USS Kitty Hawk to the Persian
Gulf as part of the largest fleet gathered in the Indian
Ocean since World War II. In response, the Iranian
regime toned down its rhetoric. Khomeini refrained
from threatening to execute or try the hostages except
in the event of a U.S. military attack (Sick 1985, 147–
48). National Security Council staffer Gary Sick says,
“On balance, there is reason to believe that the U.S.
threat of retaliation was received in Tehran, that it was
considered credible, and that it was heeded by those in
authority” (Sick 1985, 149). Comments by Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani and others in the regime illustrate
that the Iranians were aware of the electoral cycle in
the United States and the effect of the hostage crisis on
Carter’s bid for reelection (Sick 1991, 86, 164). Thus,
threats deterring action against the hostages were cred-
ible, but threats designed to compel their release were
unpersuasive. What was decisive in this case was the
action demanded, not the publicity of the threat.
Overall, it appears that the U.S. public cared first
and foremost about substantive policy costs—getting
the hostages home safely—and then about reputational
costs irrespective of whether threats were made—pre-
serving the honor of the United States and punishing
Iran. There is little evidence that the public cared at all
about—or was even aware of—audience costs as Fearon
and Tomz define them.
THREAT FAILS AND IS CARRIED OUT:
SINO-INDIAN WAR
It is fairly common that a target fails to comply with
a democracy’s threat and the democracy carries it out.
A number of post-Cold War cases fit this pattern: the
failure of Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait in
1991; his failure to fully comply with U.S. demands for
maximally intrusive weapons inspections and later for
his abdication in 2003; the failure of the Taliban to hand
over al-Qaeda leaders responsible for the September
11, 2001, terror attack; and Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevic’s refusal to accept highly invasive U.S. peace
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terms for Kosovo in the Rambouillet talks. All of these
were ambitious attempts at compellence (warnings de-
manding a change in the status quo), not deterrence.
The failure to comply arguably stemmed not from a
lack of U.S. credibility but from inability to comply in
the Taliban case, the prohibitively high cost of compli-
ance for Saddam in 2003 and Milosevic at Rambouillet,
and the target’s preference in each case to fight and lose
rather than give up without a fight. In no case did U.S.
leaders use committing threats to tie their hands to
carry out policies that they would otherwise have been
reluctant to implement. Audience costs are largely ir-
relevant to these cases.
Among Cold War crises, the Sino-Indian war of 1962
comes closest to illustrating the causal mechanisms
of audience costs theory in the case of a democratic
leader carrying out a threat when the target fails to
comply. The threat consisted of an unyielding nego-
tiating position on defining the remote, mountainous
Sino-Indian border, combined with shows of force. In
the most prominent account of this crisis in interna-
tional relations scholarship, by Richard Ned Lebow,
the case appears to provide a straightforward example
of the audience costs mechanism: During the crisis In-
dian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru went public with
Sino-Indian diplomatic correspondence that aroused
domestic antipathy toward China, locking him into a
policy of confrontation and eventually war. In fact, the
story diverges from a straightforward audience costs
account in decisive respects.
Clarity and Implementation of Threat
The western part of the Sino-Indian border in the
trackless mountains was ill defined in the 1950s be-
cause of ambiguous historical precedents and the lack
of a continuous presence on the part of officials of ei-
ther state. Tibetan separatism from China heightened
the significance of this boundary. To solidify access to
western Tibet and to control cross-border movements
of Tibetans, the Chinese began road-building in the
disputed territory. Discovering the roadwork in 1958,
India demanded Chinese withdrawal in private diplo-
matic correspondence. Minor armed clashes occurred
as India made forward troop deployments in 1959. With
each side believing that it would prevail in the event of
an armed confrontation, both remained intransigent.
Nehru’s allegedly hands-tying public threat came
when India released the first of the diplomatic cor-
respondence in September 1959. Nehru’s presentation
of the issue in Parliament portrayed China as a “bully”
usurping India’s rightful territory (Maxwell 1970, 121)
and repeatedly alluded to the possibility of war. At
the same time, Nehru left himself some room for bar-
gaining, waffling on the question of ambiguities in the
delineation of the boundary (Maxwell 1970, 117–19).
This was the first that the Indian public learned of
the dispute. Subsequent White Papers were released in
the lead-up to the war (Hoffmann 1990, 68). Forward
Indian deployments encroached on China’s strategic
road, adding a show of force to the threat implied
in the diplomatic dispute. With neither side willing to
back down, the two armies jockeyed for position in
the disputed territory, and on October 20, 1962, the
Chinese attacked, expelled the Indian forces, and then
withdrew unilaterally on November 21.
Domestic Punishment and Criticism
Lebow argues that Nehru “apparently found anti-
Chinese sentiment useful in strengthening his hand
against Peking and did his best to encourage it.” Later
in the crisis, Lebow claims, Nehru could not moderate
his policy because he “became the prisoner of the crude
nationalist passions he had helped to arouse.” Thus,
Nehru’s release of the diplomatic documents “was di-
rectly responsible for arousing the popular passions
which ultimately compelled him to pursue his challenge
of China to the point of war” (1981, 184, 188). More re-
cently, Steven Hoffman has likewise argued that public
sentiment made it “imperative for the Nehru govern-
ment to adopt only those policies that could conceiv-
ably meet with approval from an emotionally aroused
parliament and press” (1990, 68, 70–74). Assessing a
possible territorial swap, Nehru is alleged to have con-
fided to a colleague, “If I give them that I shall no longer
be Prime Minister of India” (Maxwell 1970, 161). In
short, this sounds like a domestic audience lock-in by
means of an implicit, but committing, threat.
However, the reason that the Indian political class
and attentive public came to oppose concessions was
not concern about Nehru’s credibility but the sub-
stantive view that China was an aggressor that had
to be stopped from encroaching on Indian territory
(Maxwell 1970, 103). Although China’s motive in seek-
ing a more favorable delineation of the border was
to protect a strategic road needed to suppress Ti-
betan rebels, Indian opinion agreed with Nehru that
China was acting from aggressive, not defensive, mo-
tives. The Indian public’s furor when it learned about
Chinese moves, says Hoffman, reflected a longstand-
ing, widespread view that “throughout its long history
China had shown a tendency to be ‘aggressive’” (1990,
53). In other words, the Indian public was hawkish be-
cause of its concern about substantive policy costs, not
because Nehru had put his credibility on the line.
This calculation of policy costs by both Nehru and
the Indian public was strongly influenced by their
unwarranted optimism that India would prevail in a
showdown with China. Because Nehru and his mili-
tary had an inflated estimate of India’s prospects if
matters came to a fight, he discounted the likelihood
of China taking confrontational military steps against
India (Guruswamy and Singh 2009, 74; Vertzberger
1984, 129). “I have no fear of China, great, and pow-
erful as that country is,” Nehru said in October 1959
(Vertzberger 1984, 123). In a speech to Parliament in
August 1961, Nehru declared that the balance of power
was changing in India’s favor (128). Failing to appreci-
ate the unpreparedness of the Indian army and exag-
gerating Chinese internal weaknesses as a result of the
Great Leap Forward, Nehru stuck with this assessment
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until events decisively refuted it on October 20, 1962
(123–25). Because public opinion heard no alternative
strategic analysis, they assumed that India would win
the war and thus saw no reason that Nehru should
give in to an aggressor (Lebow 1981, 190–92; Maxwell
1970, 132, 178, 240–42). Because the Indian public got
its strategic information from India’s governing elites,
Nehru and Indian opinion had the same substantive
preferences and the same assessment of the bargaining
power of the two sides. This is a case of misperception
and manipulation of apparent policy costs, not a case of
audience concerns about inconsistency between word
and deed.
Moreover, it is doubtful that audience costs concerns
led the democratic leader to undertake actions that
he would otherwise have been reluctant to carry out.
Nehru had hawkish preferences throughout the crisis,
regardless of public opinion. His shift toward more
moderate language at one stage of the crisis reflected
a desire not to compromise but to seek a negotiated
settlement almost entirely on Indian terms (Maxwell
1970, 118–19, 131–32). Nehru freely undertook the
crucial decision at the end of 1960 for forward mil-
itary deployments that threatened China’s lifeline to
Tibet. “The Government was not being spurred to im-
plement the forward policy by popular pressure,” says
Neville Maxwell, a premier historian of the crisis and
Lebow’s main source. By that time, “public interest in
the boundary dispute had simmered down” (205).
According to Maxwell, Nehru’s decision to publish
his uncompromising diplomatic correspondence with
China “worked only to push him in directions he had
chosen himself . . . so the controls were locked—but
in the positions in which Nehru had set them” (134).
Nehru was using publicity not to lock in what Sny-
der and Diesing would call a committing threat, but
simply to underscore what they would call a warning.
Moreover, the lock-in mechanism depended on Nehru
convincing the Indian public that an uncompromising
policy was correct, not mainly on his putting his own
credibility on the line. This is not an audience costs case
in the narrow sense in which Fearon and his successors
have defined it.
Reputational Concerns
Hoffman (1990, 48–49) argues that the Indian public’s
mindset was hypersensitive about affronts to Indian
sovereignty. If so, this attitude might have inclined
them to punish leaders whose reputation for stand-
ing up to Chinese challenges had been tarnished. In-
deed, in the aftermath of the diplomatic revelations of
1959, Defense Minister Krishna Menon was attacked
for allegedly neglecting the army and advocating the
earlier policy of friendship with China (Lebow 1981,
187). However, this criticism had nothing to do with
backing away from a threat. Rather, it rebuked Menon
for not being tough enough on China in the first place.
The reputation of Nehru, the 70-year-old founder
of independent India and leader of a one-party-
dominated democracy, was not much in doubt. Maxwell
(1970, 113) says that “Nehru’s dominance was by no
means absolute,” but opposition to him was “latent”
and “muted.” Notwithstanding Nehru’s disingenuous
remark about losing power if he compromised, he
seems far too entrenched a leader to have gained much
bargaining leverage from potential audience costs. This
limits the potential scope of whatever audience costs
dynamics might have been operating during the crisis.
Target’s Assessment of
Domestic Audience Costs
Nehru’s threats failed to deter the authoritarian Chi-
nese opponent for several possible reasons, any of
which would call into question an audience costs ac-
count. Some scholars argue that the Chinese leadership
failed to appreciate how Indian public opinion might
act as a constraint on government policy. For example,
according to research based on transcripts of a 1959
Chinese Politburo meeting on the Tibetan rebellion,
“because the Chinese leader [Mao] did not appreciate
India’s democratic and pluralist political system, he
regarded all the criticism from India (including from
the Indian media) as indications of the Indian gov-
ernment’s support for the rebels” (Guruswamy and
Singh 2009, 78; Jian 2006, 54–101). One People’s Re-
public of China military historian, however, says that
Mao believed that Nehru was carrying out his bellicose
strategy in part to divert the attention of the Indian
public from its domestic problems.14 If so, this would
indicate the salience of Indian domestic politics in Chi-
nese thinking, but not an audience costs mechanism.
Alternatively, it seems plausible that the Chinese did
expect India to attack, but believed that Nehru had
grossly overestimated India’s diplomatic and military
advantages, and thus did not fear a fight (Christensen
2006, 64).
THREAT SUCCEEDS:
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
A number of post-1945 international crises have pro-
ceeded on the path expected by audience costs theory,
in the sense that an authoritarian state complied with
a democratic state’s threat. But in fact these cases had
little to do with the causal mechanism stipulated in the
strictly stated version of audience costs theory. Often
the military balance favored the democratic power, so
the target backed down. Domestic politics frequently
did not matter very much, and when it did, substan-
tive policy views were more salient than concerns over
consistency between the leader’s talk and action.
Several cases superficially fit Tomz’s experimental
finding that audience costs are greater in cases of shows
of force than in cases of merely verbal threats. To men-
tion some examples, verbal threats to the Communists
to withdraw from Trieste in 1945 achieved nothing un-
til military forces were deployed; President Kennedy’s
14 Christensen (2006, 64), discussing the arguments of the Chinese
military historian Xu Yan.
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verbal warning about the Pathet Lao’s encroachment
on Thailand had little effect until troop deployments
led to a negotiated settlement; complaints to the North
Koreans following the deadly incident over the prun-
ing of a poplar tree in the DMZ in 1976 accomplished
nothing until the United States made a show of force.
But domestic hands-tying had nothing to do with these
incidents. Rather, the powerful U.S. military became
directly engaged against a weaker adversary in circum-
stances that strongly implied that there was little room
or time left to avoid an immediate clash that the oppo-
nent could hardly want (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).
In some cases of successful threats, domestic political
considerations cut against an audience costs account.
For example, President Clinton threatened invasion to
bring order to Haiti in 1994, deploying naval forces
and readying a landing party to intimidate Haitians
who were resisting international intervention. These
Haitian foes, recalling Clinton’s abandonment of the
humanitarian intervention in Somalia in the face of
light casualties, gathered on the dock and shouted
“Mogadishu! Mogadishu!” Nonetheless, their leaders
capitulated, but hardly because audience costs tied
Clinton’s hands. Only 31% of Americans supported
the intervention, and even after it had succeeded, only
41% did (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). This doubly
undermines the audience costs argument, first because
opinion was inclined to punish carrying out the threat,
and second because opinion was driven more by views
on substantive policy costs than by concerns about con-
sistency between word and deed.
Though superficially on the expected path, the Tai-
wan straits crisis of 1954–55, when Communist China
shelled the Kuomintang-held coastal islands of Que-
moy and Matsu, turns audience costs theory on its head.
Instead of using threats to lock in deterrence by raising
domestic costs of withdrawal, President Eisenhower
publically hedged his threat in order to bring doves
into a domestic consensus behind his policy. Only when
he decided that mollifying domestic critics was less im-
portant than sending a stronger deterrent signal did
he switch to a more threatening stance, saying that
the United States would use tactical atomic weapons
to defend the offshore islands “just as you would use
a bullet or anything else” (Chang 1988, 108). When
Eisenhower’s nuclear threats provoked howls of do-
mestic U.S. and international protest, the President
once again changed his tack. Telling his national se-
curity team in March 1955 that war over Quemoy and
Matsu would be “undesirable” because the allies would
not support it and U.S. opinion would be divided, he
dispatched Admiral Radford to Taipei to propose that
Chiang Kai-shek pull his troops out of the offshore
islands (Taylor 2009, 478–82). The mainland Chinese
eventually backed down despite U.S. public protests
characterizing the Pentagon’s war plans as reckless
(George and Smoke 1974, 291), contrary to the ex-
pectations of audience costs theory.
The Cuban missile crisis looks superficially to be on
the path expected by audience costs theorists in that
Kennedy made threats and Khrushchev backed down.
Moreover, Kennedy did indeed worry about being per-
ceived as failing to carry out a threat and suffering
domestic punishment for that reason. Nonetheless, au-
dience costs theory is a poor guide to understanding
the dynamics of the crisis and its outcome. Kennedy’s
threat to respond to any emplacement of offensive
missiles in Cuba was ambiguous, leaving him room to
maneuver and escape punishment. He issued the threat
not to tie his own hands, but because he was already
under pressure from a hawkish public and opposition.
Kennedy’s reputational concerns focused mainly on
how he would appear to the Soviets and to U.S. allies,
not to domestic critics. Finally, Khrushchev seems to
have been completely tone-deaf to the audience costs
mechanism.
Clarity and Implementation of Threat
Until September 1962, Kennedy made no clear threat
to deter the Soviet decision to ship missiles, bombers,
and nuclear warheads to Cuba because his intelligence
service saw this contingency as highly improbable. Only
after Republican Senator Kenneth Keating publicized
rumors of significant Soviet missile deployments did
Kennedy warn on September 4 that “the gravest issues
would arise” if offensive ground-to-ground missiles
were deployed in Cuba.15 Just 72 hours later Kennedy
learned of photographs indicating that the Soviets had
already done exactly that (Fursenko and Naftali 1997,
206, 227). After 13 days of deliberation, Kennedy went
public on October 22 with the compellent demand that
the Soviet Union withdraw offensive strategic forces
from Cuba. He announced that a naval “quarantine”
would be a first step toward enforcing U.S. demands.
In Snyder and Diesing’s terms, these were neither
full-fledged committing threats nor warning threats,
because they were ambiguous about the actions the
United States would take. Rather, they were “problem-
atic threats,” because the threatener (not to mention
the target) was unsure what he would do in the face of
noncompliance. As it turned out, Khrushchev removed
the missiles and warheads, and Kennedy gave him a
public but not formal promise not to invade Cuba and
a secret promise to remove obsolete U.S. missiles from
Turkey.
Domestic Punishment and Criticism
U.S. officials worried about their domestic political vul-
nerability in light of the hawkish attitudes of the U.S.
public.16 Criticism from domestic hawks goaded Presi-
dent Kennedy to issue his September 4 threat, and top
officials later discussed whether this threat had created
potential audience costs if Kennedy failed to carry it
out sufficiently. This case supports our conjecture that
audience costs are most likely to arise as a second-order
15 Department of State Bulletin, September 4, 1962, 450, cited in
Stern (2003, 27).
16 We surveyed all major national newspapers from September 1962
through November 1962 using ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
We searched for all articles containing the words “Kennedy” and
“Cuba.”
452
American Political Science Review Vol. 105, No. 3
complication when public opinion already has hawkish
preferences and pushes the democratic leader toward
making a committing threat.
U.S. public opinion was quite hawkish through-
out the crisis, even before Kennedy made any public
threats. In the wake of the failure to follow through
with the Bay of Pigs invasion, Cuba was the only for-
eign policy issue for which Kennedy received negative
public opinion ratings at the beginning of 1962. Even
before the revelations about the Soviet missiles, 70%
of the increasingly hawkish U.S. public wanted tougher
action against Castro’s Cuba—not war, but measures to
“starve them out.” Overall Kennedy’s approval rating
was 60% before the crisis, rose to 76% immediately
afterward, but by March 1963 fell back to 66% in part
because of continuing Soviet troop presence in Cuba
(Freedman 2000, 161, 225, 249; Weisbrod 2001). In this
climate, Kennedy hardly needed to manufacture ad-
ditional audience costs to convey the possibility that
he might be punished for taking too weak a line on
offensive missiles in Cuba.
Concerns about the potential domestic cost of taking
too soft a line against the missile deployments pervade
the ExComm discussions. Early in the crisis on October
16, Assistant Secretary of State Edward Martin opined
that “you’ve got to move immediately, or . . . you’re
going to have a lot of instability in this country,” to
which President Kennedy responded, “Oh, I under-
stand that.” At the same session, Defense Secretary
Robert McNamara said, “I don’t believe it’s primar-
ily a military problem. It’s primarily a domestic polit-
ical problem” (Stern 2003, 82, 93). At the October 18
meeting, Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon jotted to
speechwriter Theodore Sorensen, “Have you consid-
ered the very real possibility that if we allow Cuba to
complete installation and operational readiness of mis-
sile bases, the next House of Representatives is likely
to have a Republican majority?” (George 2003, 115,
125, 204).
Reputational Concerns
Kennedy’s concern about his reputation for resolve in
the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and his harrowing
meeting with the blustering Khrushchev in Vienna had
both international and domestic dimensions. His tele-
vised statement announcing the blockade, like his early
book Why England Slept, invoked the appeasement of
Hitler: “The 1930s taught us a lesson: Aggressive con-
duct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged,
ultimately leads to war” (Fursenko and Naftali 1997,
246). This echoed the October 16 ExComm discussions
in which Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy worried
that “a year from now” the Cubans could blackmail
other Latin American countries, and the President ob-
served that a failure to act would make Cuba appear
“coequal with us,” or as Dillon put it, as if “we’re scared
of the Cubans.” Martin stressed “the psychological fac-
tor of our having taken it,” meaning that the United
States could not appear to “have sat back and let ‘em
do it to us, that is more important than the direct threat”
(Stern 2003, 81–82).
Kennedy’s recorded teˆte-a`-teˆte with his brother
Robert on the day after his televised announcement
revealed that this foreign policy danger interacted with
his domestic concerns. The President told him, “It looks
like it’s gonna be real mean, doesn’t it? But on the
other hand, there’s really no choice. If they get this
mean on this one—Jesus Christ! What are they gonna
fuck up next?” The Attorney General responded, “No,
there wasn’t any choice. I mean you woulda had a . . .
you woulda been impeached.” “Well, that’s what I
think,” the President replied, “I woulda been im-
peached” (Stern 2003, 204).
Thus, the President and his advisers worried about
the reputational foreign policy costs of seeming weak
and about the risk of domestic punishment by a hawk-
ish public, whether or not they had made explicit state-
ments of commitment. In addition, they also worried
about audience costs stemming from unfulfilled threats.
Historian Sheldon Stern provides atmospheric com-
mentary that helps shed light on the following JFK
quotation from the October 16 ExComm meeting, re-
gretting his September 4 public threat:
“Last month,” he began, in an almost jocular tone as
several advisers chuckled in the background, “I said we
weren’t going to [accept offensive missiles in Cuba] and
last month I should have said we’re . . . well, that we don’t
care. But when we said we’re not going to, and then they
go ahead and do it, and then we do nothing,” he suddenly
became very somber, “then . . . I would think our . . . risks
increase.” (Stern 2003, 82)
But was Kennedy referring to domestic audience
costs of his failed deterrent threat, or foreign ones?
On the sole occasion when an ExComm participant
used the word audience, it was in a strictly international
context. On October 27, National Security Adviser Mc-
George Bundy said “there are two different audiences
here, Mr. President,” the Soviets and the NATO allies;
“if we sound as if we wanted to make this trade to
our NATO people and all those who are tied to us by
alliance, we are in real trouble” (Stern 2003, 316).
McNamara, however, invoked audience costs in a
clearly domestic context on October 16, but argued
that domestic audience costs could be escaped without
having to attack Cuba: “This is a domestic political
problem. In our announcement, we didn’t say we’d go
in and not that we’d kill them. We said we’d act. Well,
how will we act?”17 Implying that Kennedy’s Septem-
ber 4 statement had been ambiguous about means,
McNamara suggested that the threat could be carried
out by intensive surveillance, naval blockade, and a
more explicit deterrent threat against the launch of the
missiles that were already in place (Stern 2003, 91–92).
Kennedy’s critics, however, warned him that reputa-
tional costs could not be escaped so easily, at least in the
international arena. Senator Richard Russell, meeting
17 Stern (2003, 91). The May and Zelikow transcript (1997, 113), has
it as “We didn’t say we’d go in or not, and kill them.”
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with the President just before his televised speech, re-
minded Kennedy that “you have warned these people
[the Soviets] time and again . . . as to what would
happen if there was an offensive capability created in
Cuba. They can’t say they’re not on notice.” We should
“assemble . . . an adequate force and clean out that
situation,” or else “time’s gonna come, Mr. President,
when we’re gonna have to take this gamble in Berlin, in
Korea, in Washington, D.C. and Winder, Georgia, . . .
for the nuclear war.” “The more that we temporize,
the more surely he [Khrushchev] is to convince himself
that we are afraid to . . . really fight” (Stern 2003, 165).
In all of these examples, the risk of audience costs
was directly bound up with the substantive argument
that failure to resist aggression would lead to more
aggression in the future. Domestic audience costs from
a possible failure to carry out a threat were a con-
cern only because a sizeable, powerful domestic con-
stituency was already worried about international rep-
utational costs before the threat was issued. McGeorge
Bundy later claimed that Kennedy’s September 4 warn-
ing was issued to defuse hawkish pressures at home:
“We did it because of the requirements of domestic
politics, not because we seriously believed the Soviets
would do anything as crazy from our standpoint as
placement of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba” (Weis-
brod 2001, 93). In short, hawkish domestic attitudes
about reputational costs cannot in this case be “held
constant” to test the separate impact of domestic au-
dience costs because these underlying hawkish prefer-
ences set up the conditions giving rise to audience costs.
No preexisting international reputational concerns, no
domestic audience costs.
Though concerned about the consequences of look-
ing weak, the Kennedys were far from locked in by
international reputational costs or by domestic audi-
ence costs. In fact, they saw political dangers in behav-
ing too belligerently as well as too passively. Robert
Kennedy, wondering how it would look to reject the
Soviet proposal to trade for the Turkish missiles, notes
that the man in the street could easily think that the
Soviet offer “is very reasonable . . . And we just turned
it down, now suddenly we drop the bomb on Cuba”
(Stern 2003, 320). In response to McNamara’s harp-
ing on Kennedy’s domestic political problem, Kennedy
adopted a “lecturing” tone, says Stern, pointing out that
an invasion of Cuba would strain the NATO alliance,
because the allies see the United States as “slightly
demented on this subject” and do not want to risk a
major war over Cuba (100). Likewise, Kennedy later ar-
gued that the allies would accept a trade of the Turkish
missiles once they realized that the alternative would
be Soviet retaliation against them for a U.S. attack on
Cuba (324).
The Kennedys frequently demonstrated an aware-
ness of the importance of publicity as a factor con-
straining their own as well as Soviet options, but they
sought to manage this problem tactically and not let it
drive their overall strategy. Managing publicity prob-
lems emerges as a tactical issue repeatedly. The Presi-
dent argued that Khrushchev’s proposal on the Turkish
missiles could not simply be ignored because it was
public (Stern 2003, 422). Kennedy was willing to trade
away the Turkish missiles, but was determined to keep
the deal private to avoid seeming an unreliable protec-
tor in allies’ eyes. Publicity of a pledge not to invade
Cuba was less worrisome, because forswearing risky
aggression had no reputational disadvantages for the
audience of U.S. allies, though Kennedy still did not
want to release a letter containing the pledge until
he was sure the deal would be accepted (334). In an-
other example earlier in the crisis, Robert Kennedy
worried that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko would
announce the missile deployment just before the Pres-
ident’s television appearance in a way that would lock
the Soviets into a commitment, and RFK suggested
a quick preemptive statement (148). In all these ways,
the Kennedys adjusted their tactics to considerations of
publicity, trying to contain domestic audience costs and
especially international reputational costs, but they did
not use audience costs to try to lock into an irrevocable
bargaining position.
Target’s Assessment of
Domestic Audience Costs
Although Khrushchev made numerous remarks about
the effect of U.S. domestic politics on Kennedy’s policy
toward the missile issue, he does not seem to have had
a coherent understanding of audience costs and was
not deterred because of them. Insofar as Khrushchev
took Kennedy’s audience problems into account in de-
signing his strategy, it seems that Khrushchev expected
Kennedy to keep quiet about any missile intelligence
until after the November 1962 Congressional elections,
by which time the missiles would be operational and
thus too risky to attack (Taubman 2003, 543, 555).
More generally, Khrushchev held the somewhat self-
contradictory view that, on the one hand, the Soviets
needed to bargain from strength with Kennedy, who
was captive to the “reactionaries” around him, but
on the other hand that Kennedy lacked the resolve to
prevent the Soviets from achieving such a position of
strength in Cuba (552). Khrushchev failed to consult
any experts on the United States (Stern 2003, 112).
Gromyko told him well before Kennedy’s September
4 warning that the missile deployment would “cause a
political explosion in the U.S. I am absolutely certain
of that.” But Khrushchev told him he had no intention
of changing his policy (Taubman 2003, 544).
Khrushchev tried to banish U.S. domestic audience
costs and reputational costs through sheer obstinacy.
At Vienna, Kennedy warned Khrushchev not to de-
mand concessions that would weaken Kennedy do-
mestically in light of his narrow margin of victory over
Nixon and the strength of the hawkish Congressional
opposition. Reassuringly, Khrushchev told him not to
worry about a withdrawal from Berlin, because “U.S.
prestige will not be involved, and everybody will un-
derstand this” (Taubman 2003, 499).
Sometimes it seemed that Khrushchev simply
paid no attention to the way his tactics heightened
Kennedy’s reputational and audience costs. According
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to Khrushchev’s foreign policy assistant Oleg Troy-
anovsky, “It never occurred to anyone that publicizing
the Turkish aspect of the deal would create additional
difficulties for the White House” (Taubman 2003, 570).
As the ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Do-
brynin, said later, “Frankly, I don’t have the impression
that everything was thought through” (552). Super-
ficially, it might appear that the Cuban missile crisis
developed more or less on the path expected by audi-
ence costs theory, but it would be hard to argue that
Khrushchev was compelled to withdraw the missiles
from Cuba because he was sensitive to or impressed by
Kennedy’s audience costs.
CONCLUSION:
AUDIENCE COSTS IN PERSPECTIVE
Domestic audience costs, defined narrowly by Tomz
(2007, 821) as “the domestic price that a leader would
pay for making foreign threats and then backing
down,” seem to have at most a very small effect on
crisis behavior. This is true for several reasons. First,
unambiguous committing threats (ones that commit
a previously uncommitted actor) are rare in crises at
the brink of war, because leaders correctly see them
as imprudent. The more ambiguous threats that such
leaders actually make contain escape clauses that al-
low them to mitigate audience costs if they decide to
back down. Second, domestic audiences understand-
ably care more about policy substance than about con-
sistency between a leader’s words and deeds. Where
these criteria are in conflict, punishment is more likely
to be doled out for an unpopular policy than for a
failure to carry out a threat. Third, domestic audiences
do care about their country’s reputation for resolve and
national honor, but they care about meeting such chal-
lenges independent of whether the leader has issued
an explicit threat. Fourth, authoritarian states probably
do try to understand the domestic political context of
democratic states’ crisis threats, but narrowly defined
audience costs are only a small part of that domestic
context, and there is little evidence that authoritarian
targets of democratic threats perceive audience costs
dynamics in the same way that audience costs theorists
do.
We have commented on some of the most prominent
post-1945 international crises between a democracy
and an authoritarian state, and we have built on studies
of all twentieth-century crises. We surveyed compre-
hensive databases and chose what we thought would
be the easiest cases for audience costs theory, in which
threats were fairly clear and the domestic political audi-
ence of the democratic threatener was actively engaged
in the crisis. We looked at cases that were both on and
off the path predicted by the theory.
The fact that we found so little evidence of audience
costs mechanisms in these cases suggests that the sig-
nificance of the theory needs to be reassessed. We ac-
cept the logic that leaders might sometimes face some
domestic cost for inconsistency between their threats
and actions, but the significance of this claim must be
very heavily qualified in light of a more comprehen-
sive understanding of crisis bargaining and the actual
track record of twentieth-century crisis behavior. This
conclusion is important not only for theory but also for
policy. Future leaders of democracies should not come
away from their political science classes having gained
the impression that democracies can safely get their
way in a crisis by publically committing themselves to
fight for otherwise unpersuasive objectives.
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